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VOTERS WEIGH PARTY PLEDGES OF INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

TO an extent unmatched even by the Presidential elections of 1920, the present campaign is focused on issues of foreign policy. Today voters are earnestly trying to decide not whether the United States should collaborate with other nations, but which of the two parties will prove most capable of assuring our effective participation in an international organization to prevent aggression and promote the welfare of all peoples. Specific decisions of the Administration have been criticized, from different points of view, by those who on the one hand feel that the United States has gone too far in working with other countries and, on the other, by those who feel it has not gone far enough. But, after sifting all these criticisms, and acknowledging that international collaboration is the avowed objective of both parties, the voters still face the task of deciding which one of the two candidates will prove more determined, and least vulnerable to isolationist pressures, in achieving this objective.

PRESIDENT TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. It is to this issue that President Roosevelt addressed himself in his speech to the Foreign Policy Association on October 21. He did not attempt to answer point by point the charges leveled at the foreign policy of his Administration by Governor Dewey at the *Herald Tribune* Forum on October 18. Instead of being on the defensive, the President took the offensive: first, by listing some of the measures of international collaboration that were opposed by Republican members of Congress before Pearl Harbor—notably the reciprocal trade treaties, the selective service law, lend-lease; and, second, by pointing out the strategic positions now occupied in Congressional committees dealing with foreign affairs and appropriations by Republicans long committed to a policy of isolation. At the same time, he paid a warm tribute to “distinguished men and women of vision and courage” in the Republican party “who have vigorously sup-

ported our aid to our allies and all the measures that we took to build up our national defense.” He emphasized the need “to complete the organization of the United Nations without delay, before hostilities actually cease,” and expressed his belief that the Security Council of this organization—as proposed at Dumbarton Oaks—“must have the power to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force, if necessary.” To achieve this end, he said, the American representative on the Council “must be endowed in advance by the people themselves, by constitutional means through their representatives in Congress, with authority to act.” By stressing this crucial point the President indicated both the concrete step by which the United States can best assure other countries that it is sincere in urging prompt action against future aggressors, and the paramount necessity of having in Congress men and women who, whatever their party affiliations, “want their government to act, and not merely talk, whenever and wherever there is a threat to world peace.”

DECISION WOULD CLARIFY POLICY. Only when the United States has decided to participate fully and promptly in an international organization will it be able to develop a coherent foreign policy, unhampered by the debate waged since the turn of the century concerning the degree of responsibility this country should assume in world affairs. Our choice is not between isolation and collaboration. At no time in our history have we really wanted to be completely isolated from the rest of the world. On the contrary, Americans have wanted to trade everywhere freely, to send missionaries abroad, to share in the cultural heritage of other peoples. What we have been reluctant to do is to assume any lasting political or military commitments outside our own borders or, at least, the borders of the Western Hemisphere. Now we see that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. We cannot demand the open door for

our trade, freedom of the seven seas, and opportunities for our citizens to travel and teach in other lands unless we are ready to collaborate politically as well. We cannot enjoy the advantages of international collaboration, and take none of its risks.

DEWEY'S CRITICISMS. Without such clarification of our foreign policy, it is difficult, in fact futile, to dispute among ourselves concerning this or that attitude toward given countries. Governor Dewey expressed the sentiments of many Americans when he deplored the predicament of Poland and urged the recognition of de Gaulle—accorded by the United States, Britain and Russia on October 23. But it is not enough to deplore this situation, or urge that measure, unless this country is determined to assume responsibility henceforth for its professions of friendship for other peoples. It is unfortunate, under the circumstances, that many of the newspapers and political spokesmen who now feel so much sympathy for Poland or France showed so little desire to have the United States lift a finger for these countries in their hour of need. Nor will the cause of collaboration with other nations be advanced if natural concern for Poland should be used as a springboard for attacks on Russia. It is regrettable that Governor Dewey should have intimated that the armistice concluded on September 13 by General Malinowski of the U.S.S.R. with Rumania on behalf of his own country, as well as Britain and the United States—just as General Eisenhower had concluded an armistice with Marshal Badoglio of Italy on behalf of the United States, Britain and Russia—was a secret treaty, for the document he referred to was published on September 14 in the *New York Times*, and

three days later in the September 17 issue of the weekly Department of State *Bulletin*.

Many citizens would agree with Mr. Dewey in regretting that the United States has not yet clarified its policy with respect to Germany—although President Roosevelt took a step in that direction on October 21. But here again our policy will take one form if the country decides to reduce collaboration with other nations to a minimum, and an entirely different one if it maintains an effective partnership in the common enterprise of post-war reconstruction. Governor Dewey made it plain that he does not differ from the Administration in his support of international collaboration. While not going as far as President Roosevelt did three days later in asking that Congress give the American representative on the Security Council the right to act promptly, he declared: "We must make certain that our participation in this world organization is not subjected to reservations that would nullify its power to maintain peace and to halt future aggression."

It is on the question of which party will best be able to prevent such nullification that the American people will have to decide on November 7. At a time when millions of our citizens are fighting overseas, those of us who enjoy the privilege of voting are, as President Roosevelt said, trustees for the men and women who fell in the last war and are falling in this war. We have no right to rest, or concentrate on the advancement of our personal interests and ambitions, or taste the joys of peacetime living, until we have fulfilled this trust—not only on Election Day, but in the years ahead. VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the first of two articles.)

CHUNGKING-COMMUNIST COALITION ESSENTIAL TO CHINA'S PROGRESS


There is one main issue in Chinese politics about which all other political questions revolve. This issue is the relationship between the Central government at Chungking, ruled by the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung; with their center at Yen-an and many guerrilla régimes in the Japanese rear. Chiang and Mao symbolize the two most powerful groups in China, whose unity or disunity will determine their country's development and position in the world for many years to come. Nominally, it is true, there is but one Chinese government—at Chungking. But Chiang's administration, although leading resistance against Japan for more than seven years, has not yet achieved a genuine coalescence of all the elements that make up wartime China. The Communists and Chungking are fighting parallel wars against Japan, based on separate home fronts with distinct economic, political and military structures. The net effect is to weaken Japan, but China also suffers as a result of these internal divisions.

WHO ARE THE COMMUNISTS? The Commu-

nist-led Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies, under General Chu Teh and other masters of mobile warfare, range over vast areas in north and central China and reach almost to the outskirts of such centers as Peiping, Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow. In the south allied guerrilla fighters operate around Canton. Virtually the whole of Communist China consists of islands of guerrilla territory retaken from the Japanese after being lost to them by Central or provincial forces. The single exception is the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region in the northwest, which—with its population of something under 2,000,000—was held by the Communists before the war and has not been invaded by the Japanese.

From 1939 on the Chungking government refused to allow correspondents to visit the Border Region and instituted a physical blockade to cut it off from supplies and contacts with the outside world. This blockade is still maintained, but in May 1944 a group of newspapermen was permitted to travel to the northwest. The dispatches of the American reporters, published in this country in recent months, tell a

Washington News Letter



GUERRILLAS WILL EXPECT ROLE IN PHILIPPINES GOVERNMENT

Within the Philippines the United States has many active allies, organized into guerrilla groups, which have been harassing the Japanese and collaborationists during the years between the surrender of United States forces at Corregidor on May 6, 1942 and the invasion of Leyte Island on October 20, 1944. In a report to Tokyo earlier this month, the Japanese Ambassador in Manila, Shozo Murata, complained that alone among the regions of the co-prosperity sphere the Philippines were kept in disorder by guerrilla bands, in some of which Americans as well as Filipinos were fighting.

LAUREL UPSET BY NONCOOPERATION. Actions of the puppet government of the Philippine "republic," led by "President" José Laurel, reflect the disquiet created throughout the islands by the guerrillas and by the widespread noncooperation of other Filipinos. Seeking "peace and order," Laurel late in August reorganized the islands' constabulary, whose new commanding officer, Major General Paulino Santos, announced a policy of "strict law enforcement." In September Laurel divided the islands into seven administrative districts, in order—among other reasons—to "coordinate the government activities with those of the Japanese military authorities." In many districts the local officials, in opposition to the central government's collaborationist policies, had been interfering with the efforts of the Japanese to maintain their defenses against the expected United Nations invasion.

Resentment against the puppet government has been intensified since September 22, when Laurel declared war on the United States and invoked martial law "to suppress treason, sedition, disorder and violence, and to forcibly punish all disturbances of public peace." Apparently the war declaration threatened the unity of the cabinet. Foreign Minister Clark M. Recto commented that it had thrown the country into a state of "temporary confusion." Teofilo Sison, Home Minister, predicted that the state of war would probably cause a further deterioration of respect for law and order. On September 25 Laurel admitted the weakness of his leadership and the disunity of the nation by announcing that "on no occasion" would he authorize conscription of Filipinos to fight for Japan, although conscription is essential to implement the declaration of war.

Japan's policy of exploiting the islands economically and its failure to provide adequate imports of food for the Filipinos are among the factors respon-

sible for the unwillingness of the people to support the agents of Japan or Laurel. The chief economic program of the Philippines under Japanese rule was production of critical minerals—copper, chrome and manganese—for export to Japan. For this purpose labor was diverted to the mines, and hundreds of trucks were used to transport the minerals to ports.

Japan has made small return for this precious loot in the one commodity the Philippines badly need—foodstuffs. Last May the Japanese army announced its determination to import "large quantities" of rice, but a shipping shortage prevented fulfillment of this decision—assuming that the will was there. The Filipinos' need became so acute, however, that on September 14 the Imperial Japanese Army contributed 2,000,000 pesos to the Philippine relief fund and on September 18 donated 3,000 sacks of Saigon rice for distribution to the people of Manila and Cavite.

Neither this "largesse" nor the efforts of the Manila government to increase domestic agricultural production have ameliorated the food problem. Minister of Economic Affairs Pedro Sabido promised intensive output of rice and casava, improved methods for distributing food, and threats of punishment against dishonest officials who connived at violating the food control laws. Undoubtedly the United States must meet large-scale requirements for food relief.

WILL GUERRILLAS ACCEPT OSMENA? While guerrilla activities are sure to assist the advance of the invading armies, they nevertheless present this country with a grave political problem.* According to reports which have leaked out from the Philippines, many of them oppose return of the government which has been conducting its affairs from Washington as an exile capital. "At my side is your President, Sergio Osmeña," General Douglas MacArthur, commanding the invasion, said in his proclamation to the Filipinos when he landed on Leyte. A conciliatory man, Osmeña may find a common ground with the more temperate of the guerrillas, and in the Philippines—as in the liberated European countries—it is to be expected that the returning government will invite representatives of resistance groups into the cabinet. It is the hope of the United States that internal political agreement will have been reached by the date fixed for Philippine independence—July 4, 1946.

BLAIR BOLLES

*See Walter Wilgus, "Filipinos Face Serious Post-Liberation Problems," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, August 11, 1944.

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striking story of effective economic, political and military organization. They suggest, for example, that living conditions in Yen-an are better than those in Chungking; that the Border Region has a functioning democratic government, popularly elected and representing the opinions of diverse elements among the people; and that all energies are directed toward vigorous prosecution of the war against Japan.

GUERRILLA POWER. One correspondent reports that the Communists claim to have under their administration in the northwest and in guerrilla China 86,000,000 people, i.e. almost one-fifth the population of pre-war China if the usual estimate of 450,000,000 is accepted. A Communist representative in Chungking also has declared that there are 470,000 regular troops in the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies, in addition to 2,200,000 guerrillas in an organization known as the People's Volunteer Corps. Whether or not these figures are entirely correct, the general impression they are intended to convey is undoubtedly warranted: the Communists wield enormous political and military power and will inevitably play a highly significant role in shaping China's future. Not only is their absolute strength far greater today than in 1937, but they have gained in relative standing as a result of Chungking's deteriorating position, particularly in the past six months of Japanese victories on the China front.

The fact is that the leaders of guerrilla China have developed an effective formula for organizing mass resistance to Japan on the basis of agricultural reforms, popular government and democratic military organization. That such a formula has not been developed by the Kuomintang is clear, for the Communists would hardly hold the areas they do if the Central government had an adequate program with which to undermine Japan's control of overrun provinces. Under a double blockade imposed by the enemy and by Chungking, the Communists have achieved an amazing degree of self-sufficiency and have expanded their domain. But the main point to be noted is that foreign visitors who have published their impressions have found the guerrilla program a moderate one, consonant with the principles espoused by the Kuomintang.

FAILURE OF A MISSION. This past spring and summer Lin Tsu-han, chairman of the Border Region, was in Chungking to negotiate a political settlement. His mission failed. The Central government offered to authorize and supply 10 divisions of the Eighteenth Group Army (100,000-150,000 men), to recognize the existence of the Border Region gov-

ernment, and to consider making a verbal promise to end the blockade if a general agreement was reached. Remaining Communist troops were to be disbanded, authorized forces were to be concentrated in a designated area, and local guerrilla governments were to be taken over by Chungking representatives. Lin, however, proposed recognition of a much larger number of divisions, disposition of the guerrilla regions under the National Military Council on the basis of principles beneficial to the war of resistance, the granting of legality to all political parties (at present only the Kuomintang is legal), and the guaranteeing of free speech, press and assembly. He also requested the immediate establishment of popular constitutional government.

These and other issues involved in the discussions are more than the private affair of two conflicting parties. They are a subject of debate between the Kuomintang and third-party or independent elements in Free China, as well as within the Kuomintang itself. In the past year sharp differences have developed inside the official party, with Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, leading those circles which consider it essential to make genuine concessions for unity if China's sacrifices are not to be in vain. These circles also understand that if the Chungking government is to represent all patriotic groups by becoming a coalition régime, the Kuomintang must advance a progressive program capable of winning true popular support. But reactionary officials—men like Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu, two brothers high in the Kuomintang bureaucracy—oppose the abolition of one-party rule and seek to preserve the reign of clique politics and repression.

AMERICA—AN INTERESTED PARTY. When Americans speak frankly on Chinese questions and reach unfavorable conclusions about Chungking's attitude toward unity and democracy, this does not mean that they are forgetting the contributions made by the Chinese government even at this moment to Japan's defeat. But Americans are growing aware that Chungking faces crucial decisions which either will greatly strengthen the régime by broadening it or will weaken it both internally and in relation to the Japanese. This country naturally is concerned, for it wants a powerful China as a partner in war and peace. Since undemocratic, narrow rule is a standing invitation to civil strife, it is clear that only a progressive China can be strong enough to fulfill this role.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

(The third in a series of articles on conditions in China.)

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